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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
IN RENAISSANCE ENGLAND 
Sir John Baker∗ 
 
¶ 1 The topic of human rights may seem far removed from the territory of the early-
modern legal historian.  Everyone knows that the United Kingdom did not formally 
subscribe to human rights until 2001, and the general reaction to the title of this paper has 
been one of incredulity.  Surely there were no human rights in the time of Henry VIII or 
Bloody Mary?  Could anyone in their right mind reconcile the “Henrician despotism” with 
the rule of law?  Your topic, Professor Baker, should not occupy us for many minutes.  
Well, it depends on whether we regard such concepts as descriptive or normative.  It is 
perfectly possible to find early-modern assertions of many, perhaps most, of the standards 
or aspirations which have been relabelled in our own time using the terminology of 
universal human rights.  And it is equally possible to find instances in our own time of 
government activity falling short of those standards, especially when a country is felt to be 
in danger from hidden enemies.  A few years ago I did not think I would live to see 
common-law countries sanctioning indefinite imprisonment without charge or habeas 
corpus, or their governments killing civilians extrajudicially in non-combat situations.  
Although such things have returned, and are probably here to stay for some time, the fact 
that they are controversial nevertheless shows that the old philosophy of the rule of law is 
not moribund; indeed, it still applies in most everyday situations and is regarded as the 
ideal.  Legal and moral norms are not disproved by showing that in practice they are 
sometimes ignored or laid aside.  It is, therefore, worth exploring the hypothesis that these 
“human” rights are not such a new departure as is fashionably supposed, but rather an 
attempt to restate and refine assumptions which have long been present in the common 
law. 
 
¶ 2 Needless to say, human rights were not known by that name in Renaissance 
England, nor even in Victorian England.  English law was not primarily a law of rights, 
except in the property sense, though we do begin to hear in Tudor times of the general 
“rights” of subjects—and it may be noted that some of the earliest references are found, 
not in subversive literature, but in the legislation of our despotic Henry.  For instance, when 
English law was extended to Wales in 1536, the statute provided that everyone born in 
Wales should “enjoy and inherit all and singular freedoms, liberties, rights, privileges and 
laws within this his realm, and other the king’s dominions, as other the king’s subjects, 
naturally born within the same, enjoy and inherit.”1  In the seventeenth century the language 
                                                 
∗ Downing Professor of Law, Universty of Cambridge; fellow, St. Catharine’s College.  
1 27 Hen. 8, c. 26 (1536) (Eng.).   
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of rights became more familiar to lawyers,2 and was especially favoured by lawyer-
parliamentarians resisting the encroachments of prerogative rule under the early Stuarts.3  
The more familiar words “liberties” and “privileges” were fine-sounding enough but had a 
permissive ring to them, whereas “rights” had a more assertive flavour: liberties were 
merely allowed, whereas rights were asserted and vindicated.  As the threats of absolutism 
grew stronger under James I and Charles I, the House of Commons began collectively to 
assert the “rights” of the people,4 and the terminology of political rights entered the pages 
of constitutional history in the Petition of Right 1628 and the Declaration of Rights 1689. 
 
¶ 3 It is significant, however, that these ancient rights of which parliamentarians 
spoke were not universal “human” rights or rights derived from some abstract regime 
superior to municipal law.  They were the rights and liberties of Englishmen, inherited by 
birth like other forms of franchise or property, guaranteed over the centuries by charters of 
liberties and statutes of due process,5 and believed to be superior to such rights as might 
belong to the peoples of benighted nations.  There was little practical reason to reflect 
upon the universal rights of man in an island which believed its own rights superior to those 
of mankind in general.6  Indeed, the “rights of mankind”—as they were usually known until 
the mid -twentieth century—do not seem to be encountered as such in English common-
law sources until the reign of George II, when they surface (somewhat surprisingly) in Lord 
Hardwicke’s Court of Chancery. 7  They reach the common-law courts in the following 
reign, when they are said to include freedom from having one’s private papers searched by 
public authorities;8 freedom from slavery;9 and, more controversially, freedom from 
copyright—a right which, though itself derivable from a natural right to the fruits of one’s 
labours, inevitably collided with another right of mankind not to be restricted by 
                                                 
2 See for example the reference to the “full rights of English-men” in Le Case del Union d’Escose ove 
Angleterre , 1 Moo. 790, 793 (K.B. 1606), per Sir Edwin Sandys (amended).   
3 See for example Nicholas Fuller’s remark in 1610 that “the laws of England do as tenderly preserve 
the right and liberty of the subjects in their lawful and free trades, mysteries, and manual occupations 
as in their lands and goods.” PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT, 1610 ii. 152 (E. R. Foster ed., 1966).  
There are numerous references to rights and liberties in the great debates on the liberty of the subject 
in the 1628 Parliament. 
4 Petition of grievances (1610) , in PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT , supra note 3, at 258-259 (“the 
indubitable right of the people of this kingdom not to be made subject to any punishment that shall 
extend to their lives, lands, bodies, or goods, other than such as are ordained by the common law of 
this land, or the statutes made by their common consent in parliament.”); Sitting of 28 March 1628 , 
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES ii. 122-123 (“Let it be ordered that it is the ancient and undoubted right 
of the subjects of England not to be confined to a particular place but by act of parliament.”).    
5 The line of statutes, beginning with c. 29 of Magna Carta, and including the compendious guarantee 
of 1354. 
6 Those with grievances might see things more broadly.  An anonymous Puritan manuscript tract from 
the time of Charles I identified “nine fundamental rights and liberties” of the Jewish people, including 
religious and personal freedoms which the author claimed also for Englishmen. J. W. GOUGH , 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY  65 (1955).   
7 E.g., Roach v. Garvan, 27 Eng. Rep. 954 (1748), per  Lord Hardwicke L.C. (sentence of foreign courts 
conclusive, “otherwise the rights of mankind would be very precarious and uncertain.”); Earl of 
Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. 301, 339 (1750) (amended) (“just rights of mankind”).  
8 Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1086 (K.B. 1765), per Dunning (amended). 
9 Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 3 (1772), per Hargrave (amended). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 4  
monopoly.10  After 1789, thanks to the French revolution and Tom Paine,11 the “rights of 
man” became distinctly more sinister and disturbing to the establishment.  Indeed, in 1790 
Lord Kenyon, C.J. treated an assertion of the rights of man as tantamount to a secession 
from allegiance to the king’s government.12  Yet the older sense lived on—introducing a 
subtle difference between the revolutionary Rights of Man and the more palatable “rights 
of mankind”—and even the reactionary Lord Eldon, L.C. felt able to refer to the latter 
with benevolent toleration.13   
 
¶ 4 In taking a further step back to the Renaissance period, then, there is obviously 
no point in looking for any explicit acknowledgment of rights—human or otherwise—for 
we should only find ourselves trapped in particular corners of property law.  What we 
should look for instead are the underlying, perhaps unidentified, assumptions.  There are 
two basic features of human rights law for which comparisons might be sought in an earlier 
age.  First, there is the substantive content of the corpus of rights as now understood, in 
the sense of the broad moral or legal assumptions which they represent.  Second, and 
more fundamental from the lawyer’s point of view, there is the notion that some of those 
rights are (or ought to be) so fundamental that they are somehow entrenched against 
legislative interference.  They represent some kind of higher law, antecedent morally—if 
not historically—to man-made law, and akin in this respect to the natural law of the Roman 
and Roman-Dutch jurists and the canonists.  A precondition for both of these notions is the 
existence of a political constitution which embodies or recognises what is commonly 
labelled the Rule of Law14—meaning, in broad terms, that rulers are obliged to govern 
according to known principles of law and not in a despotic or arbitrary manner.  There is a 
case for saying that none of these three phenomena were alien to English law in the 
Renaissance period. 
 
I.      The Rule of Law 
¶ 5 Let us begin with the rule of law, which has been a subject of debate among the 
constitutional historians of Tudor England.15  No one questions that England, by the time of 
Henry VII, was a limited monarchy, which meant that government was conducted 
according to legal forms and procedures.  The king could not change the law or break it.  
                                                 
10 Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231 (K.B. 1769), per Yates J.; Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 
837, 840 (1774), per  Thurlow (amended) (“An exclusive privilege to exercise a natural faculty, is  an 
encroachment upon the rights of man.”). Copyright, of course, won. 
11 THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1791) was based on the declaration of the “droits de 
l’homme” by the revolutionary French National Assembly in 1789. 
12 Ogden v. Folliott, 3 Eng. Rep. 825, 829 (1790), per Lord Kenyon C.J. (amended). 
13 Wombwell v. Belasyse, 31 Eng. Rep. 966 (1825) (amended). 
14 The two are linked in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810, at 71 (1948) (“It is essential . . . that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.”).  
15 The principal contributions are: W. H. Dunham, Regal Power and the Rule of Law , 3 J. BRIT. STUD . 
24-56 (1964); J. Hurstfield, Was there a Tudor Despotism after all?  17 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST . 
SOC’Y 83-108 (1967); G. R. Elton, The Rule of Law in Renaissance England, in TUDOR MEN AND 
INSTITUTIONS 265-94 (A. J. Slavin ed., 1972), reprinted in 1 STUDIES IN TUDOR AND STUART 
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT  260-84 (1974) (references below are to the latter).  See THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND  63-73. 
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Everyone, including the king, was subject to the law; and the law could only be changed 
by Parliament.  As the judges advised Henry VIII in 1532, the king could not use his 
subjects contrary to the law, for instance by imprisoning them without trial.16  Moreover, 
men trained in the common law permeated the machinery of government at every level, 
and their cast of mind influenced its mode of operation.17  The historical debate concerns 
the reality behind the legal form.  The use of Parliament is not inconsistent with arbitrariness 
of a kind, since—in any age—the prevailing party will have its way even when it is plainly 
wrong.  The rule of law would be a mere figure of speech if a government could achieve 
any legislative change it wished or obtain any judicial decision which suited its purposes.  
What really matters, then, is not the mere existence of Parliament but its character, its 
representativeness and responsiveness to the world outside, and the willingness of 
governments to listen to argument and opposition.  Likewise, the effectiveness of the 
common law, as a control on executive power, requires the judiciary to be truly 
independent of the government.  The question is how far Tudor and Stuart governments 
were conducted in obedience to law, or how far the law gave way to the wishes of 
government 
¶ 6 In seeking an answer to this question, attention has often been focused on 
Henry VIII’s Statute of Proclamations (1539), which empowered the king to issue 
proclamations with the advice of his Council, and enacted that such proclamations should 
be “obeyed, observed, and kept, as though they were made by act of Parliament.”18  On 
the face of it, this might seem to give the government power to legislate without reference 
to Parliament, albeit a power which could be revoked or overridden by later statutes—as 
happened only eight years later when the act was repealed.  It certainly raised fears at the 
time, and was long debated in Parliament.  However, the primary intention of the act as 
amended seems to have been to give statutory confirmation to the long-standing practice 
of issuing proclamations in certain well-defined areas of government, chiefly to reinforce 
parliamentary enactments,19 but also in exercising acknowledged prerogative powers,20 
and it is known that the statute was passed in response to a ruling by the judges expressing 
qualms about the validity of some recent proclamations which were not warranted by any 
parent legislation.21  Resort to Parliament in this instance was intended to cure a legal 
doubt, in deference to the judges, and in that sense was consonant with rule by law.  More 
significantly, the statute itself made clear that it did not authorise proclamations made to the 
prejudice of any person’s life, liberty, or property, or in breach of any laws or customs 
                                                 
16 Serjeant Browne’s Case, 93 SELDEN SOC’Y 183, 184 (1532) (misdated 1540) (J.H. Baker ed., 1977).  
17 S. J. GUNN, EARLY TUDOR GOVERNMENT 15, 206 (1995). 
18 31 Hen. VIII, c. 8; G. R. ELTON , THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION  27-30 (2d ed., 1982) (repealed by 1 Edw. 
VI, c. 12).  Maitland referred to it as “the English Lex Regia.” F.W. MAITLAND , ENGLISH LAW AND 
THE RENAISSANCE 19 (1901). 
19 See S. B. CHRIMES, HENRY VII 175-177 (1972).  
20 For example see declarations of war and peace, alliances, provisions for defence of the realm, or 
alterations in the coinage.  These remain to this day matters of royal prerogative to be dealt with by 
proclamation rather than statute.  It was in this context that Fitzjames, C.J. and the judges advised 
Cromwell in 1531 that the export of bullion could be stopped by proclamation alone. See G. R. ELTON , 
REFORM AND RENEWAL 117-18 (1973); ELTON, TUDOR CONSTITUTION , supra note 18, at  26-27. 
21 LETTERS OF STEPHEN GARDINER 391 (J. A. Muller ed., 1933). Cf. LETTERS & PAPERS OF HENRY 
VIII 411. 
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currently in force, and practice after 1539 shows that proclamations continued to be used 
to support statutes rather than to replace them.22  The repeal of the 1539 act (in 1547) 
probably made no difference to the judges’ assertion in 1555 that “no proclamation by 
itself may make a law which was not law before, but may only confirm and ratify an old 
law, and not change it.”23  Staunford, J., a former queen’s serjeant, even held that it was 
unlawful to debase the coinage by proclamation, since that would prejudice the queen’s 
subjects.  Alterations in the currency had always been made by proclamation, but 
Staunford, J. was referring to the drastic debasement of 1551, which—by decision of the 
Privy Council rather than Parliament—had halved the value of money.24  It was clear to the 
judges throughout this period that no change in the law could be effected without 
parliamentary authority.  This supposed piece of Henrician despotism was therefore no 
different in kind from the everyday modern statutes which empower ministers to introduce 
delegated legislation in the form of Orders in Council. 
 
¶ 7 Attention has also been given to the dispensing power of the Crown, whereby 
the operation of a statute could in some circumstances be set aside by the government.25  
However, the power could only be used either to waive revenue due to the Crown or to 
dispense with a punishment, not to diminish the rights of another subject or to sanction a 
wrong which was malum in se.26  Indeed, in about 1582 the judges went so far as to rule 
that the Crown could not dispense with any statute made for the public good.27  Nor could 
the king alter the law by charter or letters patent;28 and his power to grant temporary 
exemption from its operation by writs of protection was heavily circumscribed by the 
judges.  According to one of Henry VIII’s serjeants, “the king may not grant that justice 
shall not be done, for justice binds the king himself.”29  It was conceded that the king could 
grant exemption from jury service, or from being made a serjeant at law—even though 
every such exemption was to a slight extent against the common good—on the footing that 
                                                 
22 E. R. Adair, The Statute of Proclamations, 32 ENG. HIST. REV. 34-46 (1917); G. R. Elton, Henry VIII’s 
Act of Proclamations, 75 ENG. HIST . REV. 208-22 (1960); Elton, supra note 15, at 271-274; R. W. 
HEINZE, THE PROCLAMATIONS OF THE TUDOR KINGS 153-199 (1976); M. L. Bush, The Act of 
Proclamations: a Reinterpretation, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 33-53 (1983); J. LOACH, PARLIAMENT 
UNDER THE TUDORS 9-12 (1991).  However, they sometimes went further. See HUGHES & LARKIN, 1 
TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS xxix-xxx (P.L. Hughes & J.F. Larkin eds., 1964).  
23 British Library [BL] MS. Add. 24845, fo. 31 (translated).  The reporter added, “Nevertheless various 
precedents were shown out of the Exchequer to the contrary, but the justices had no regard to them: 
quod nota bene.” Some very extensive penal proclamations had been issued in the previous decade, 
including one which purported to introduce galley slavery for spreading seditious rumours. HUGHES 
& LARKIN, supra  note 22, at 456.  Plucknett suggested that this could have been justified under the 
statute of scandalum magnatum (12 Ric. II, c. 11), which left the punishment open. TASWELL-
LANGMEAD’S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 239 n. 60 (11th ed., 1960) (1875). 
24 BL MS. Add. 24845, fo. 31; HUGHES & LARKIN, supra note 22, at 518-519, 529-530 (shillings, 
introduced in 1549, reduced in value from 12d. to 9d., and groats from 4d. to 3d.; shillings further 
reduced to 6d., groats to 2d., pennies to ½d.).  Later in the year new (debased) coins were introduced 
with the old values. Id. at 535. 
25 See  Elton, supra note 15, at 274-277. 
26 109 SELDEN SOC’Y li-liv (J.H. Baker ed., 1994). 
27 Anon. (c. 1582) BL MS. Harley 5030, fo. 37, printed in 109 SELDEN SOC’Y liv, n.62. 
28 For what follows see OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 65-66.   
29  Marmyon v. Baldwyn, 120 SELDEN SOC’Y 61, 62 (1527). 
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no individual was prejudiced by such a grant.  Admittedly justice would be obstructed if 
such grants were made to everyone; but the answer was that the king would not do 
anything so generally prejudicial.  The extent to which the king could grant licences of 
exemption from regulatory legislation, such as statutes governing exports and imports, 
raised occasional questions; but the proper answer depended on the interpretation of the 
statute in question.  
 
¶ 8 These test-cases, then, were red herrings.  Yet there were undoubtedly other 
cases in the Tudor period where the government acted despotically.  Two important cases 
from the mid-1530’s were unknown to the constitutional historians of the last generation.  
One was the case of Lord Dacre of the South (1534), when the judges were somehow 
persuaded to overturn the common learning on uses and to declare that uses of land could 
not be left by will.30  This volte-face, for which the judges were promised the king’s “good 
thanks” conveniently enabled Thomas Cromwell to drive the Statute of Uses through 
Parliament without opposition.  The government, having been defeated in the House of 
Commons upon an earlier bill, had here proceeded to undermine the opposition by 
securing a dramatic change in the common law.  By 1536, Parliament was only too willing 
to give the king all he asked, the quid pro quo being the preservation of existing titles 
notwithstanding the decision.  Then, in the case of Sir John Melton (1535), Cromwell 
managed to effect a change in the law by act of Parliament while the suit was pending, so 
as to defeat Melton’s bold claim to the Lucy inheritance—which the king wished to 
preserve for the Percy family.31  In this second case, however, the judges were less 
inclined to assist the Crown, and that is why retrospective legislation was promoted to put 
the matter beyond dispute.  Retrospective legislation, of which this was not the only 
instance,32 affords one of the clearest examples of conflict between legal formality and the 
spirit of the rule of law. 
 
¶ 9 We may never get to the bottom of what happened behind the scenes in either 
case.  Both could be made to support an argument that Henry VIII’s government under 
Cromwell was essentially despotic, in the sense that, although the outward forms of law 
were strictly observed, both judges and legislature were in practice amenable to the king’s 
will.  Nevertheless, assuming that they were unusual cases, they could also be taken as 
indicating a commitment to the law in quite a conservative sense.  Henry could have 
achieved the revenue purposes of the Statute of Uses by replacing feudal revenue with 
some new kind of regular taxation.   But that was too bold a step; regular parliamentary 
taxation to support the government in peacetime seems not yet to have been acceptable to 
political theory.33  Rather than introduce a new tax regime, the solution was to legislate 
against tax avoidance.  The king’s policy, or Cromwell’s, was in this case not to innovate 
but to restore the ancient feudal revenue of the Crown which had been severely reduced 
                                                 
30 See  J. H. BAKER, 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, in 94 SELDEN SOC’Y 195-203 (1978).  
31 See Sir John Melton’s Case (1535): Cockermouth Castle and the three Silver Luces ,  55 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 249-64 (1996), reprinted in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 363-380 (2000).  
32 OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66, n.80. 
33 Id. at 67. 
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as a result of uses.  It was a case of putting the clock back to an earlier period, and 
regaining the seignorial and prerogative rights which the common law itself gave to the 
Crown.  That is a far cry from despotism as generally understood.  In Melton’s case the 
object of the government was to protect an ancient and important inheritance from passing 
to a remote relative for breach of a medieval heraldic stipulation in a clause which seems to 
have had no parallel—a result which would have seemed bizarre to most observers, then 
or since.   
 
¶ 10 If we turn to even larger policy issues, it is possible to draw similar 
conclusions.  In an imaginary world, Henry might have introduced through Parliament a 
modern divorce law.  But that was unthinkable for a Defender of the Faith, and in any 
case, he had no grounds for dissolving his marriage ex post facto.  He wanted a decree of 
nullity under existing Canon law, a divorce to which the better opinion of contemporary 
canonists held him entitled, and this required an ecclesiastical jurisdiction independent of 
the pope—who was known to side with Aragon.  The result was revolutionary in respect 
to ecclesiastical polity, but it was achieved without secularising divorce, without altering the 
jurisdiction of the Church courts, without modifying the rules of Canon law (except in 
relation to the jurisdiction of the pope), and without separating the Church of England from 
the catholic and apostolic Church.  The execution of Sir Thomas More for denying the 
lawfulness of the break with Rome certainly shocks the conscience, in so far as the statute 
under which he was convicted was harsh, the evidence against him probably perjured, and 
the jury probably hand-picked.  Yet if More said what he was proved to have said, he had 
certainly broken the terms of the statute: he conceded as much himself.  He had not meant 
to say it, and perhaps had not said it; but that was a question of fact on which the judges 
were powerless to override the jury. 34 
 
¶ 11 Strong kings could be cruel, and not only in England.  But More’s execution 
required a formal charge alleging an offence known to the law; evidence to prove it, given 
in public, on oath, and subject to challenge; a full opportunity for More to present his own 
case; the persuasion of twelve jurors, also under oath to speak the truth; and general 
approbation both of the charge and of the conduct of the trial by the judges.  If the system 
was abused in More’s case, it does not wholly detract from the nature of the system itself, 
which already possessed many of the procedural safeguards now treated as human rights.  
Indeed, the common law was much fairer to the accused than the Canon law system which 
More thought appropriate for dealing with heretics: give them a fair trial, wrote More, and 
the streets would be swarming with them.35  I do not suggest that Henry VIII deserved 
canonisation any more than More did, but the secular law was at least moving in the 
direction of openness and procedural fairness.  More was able to question the prosecution 
witnesses and present his case.  Even the most dangerous traitors could not be done away 
                                                 
34 Id. at  417-418.  For contemporary accounts of the trial (in 1535) see 93 SELDEN SOC’Y, supra note 
16, at 58; J. Duncan & M. Derrett, The Trial of Sir Thomas More, 79 ENG. HIST . REV. 449-477 (1964), 
reprinted with revisions in ESSENTIAL ARTICLES FOR THE STUDY OF THOMAS MORE 49-78 (R. S. 
Sylvester & G. P. Marc’hadour eds., 1977).  
35 THOMAS MORE , THE DEBELLATION OF SALEM AND BIZANCE 104 (J. Guy ed., 1987).  
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with by royal decree; and there are several cases from the sixteenth century in which 
treason prosecutions were actually abandoned on advice from the judges that they were 
not legally well-founded.  Nor did the judges always favour the Crown in the conduct of 
trials.  In More’s case itself, they apparently ruled that a failure to answer questions was 
not an overt act of treason; we see here a recognition of the nascent rule against self-
incrimination.36  In the case of Lord Dacre of the North (1534), they laid down the rule 
that the court may not communicate with jurors in the absence of the accused.  Dyer’s 
notebook shows that the judges took an equally independent line in the 1570’s and 
1580’s, frustrating several prosecutions for treason on legal grounds.37  For the Tudor 
judiciary to have done more would have required interference with the process of 
prosecution, and with the examination of witnesses, to an extent not yet contemplated as 
possible.  If the judges threatened to be too difficult, they could in any case be bypassed 
by an act of attainder. Thomas Cromwell, who arranged some of Henry’s state trials in the 
1530’s, was himself condemned by Parliament without trial.38  That was lawful, in the 
sense that it was an act of legislative sovereignty, but it was undoubtedly contrary to the 
spirit of the rule of law.  However, according to Coke, that was also the view of the judges 
at the time; and it was certainly Coke’s own view a century later.39 
 
¶ 12 The last point is important for my present purpose.  Particular aberrations from 
higher standards do not disprove the prevalence and acceptance of a rule of law.  
Moreover, Henry’s determination always to act within legal forms was itself of 
consequence in shaping attitudes.  Since the rule of law is incapable of precise definition, 
the question of its prevalence in a particular age must be a matter of degree and opinion.  
Of the general attitude of the Tudor age there seems no room for doubt.  Whatever lapses 
and failures may have occurred from time to time at moments of crisis, “Tudor thinking and 
practice on the law subordinated everybody, the king included, to the rule of law.” 40 
 
                                                 
36 However, in Lord Vaux’s case (1581), they held that the privilege did not extend to misdemeanours. 
SELDEN SOC’Y, supra note 27, at lxvi-lxvii. 
37 See  G. R. ELTON, POLICY AND POLICE 299-305 (1972); The Reports of Sir John Spelman , 94 SELDEN 
SOC’Y 138-140 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978); The Notebook of Sir John Port , 102 SELDEN SOC’Y xvii-xviii (J.H. 
Baker ed., 1986); SELDEN SOC’Y, supra  note 27, at lxii-lxvii. 
38 For the growing use of acts of attainder to avoid difficulties associated with trials see Stanford E. 
Lehmberg, Parliamentary Attainder in the Reign of Henry VIII, 18 HIST . J. 675-702 (1975); William 
Stacy, Richard Roose and the Use of Parliamentary Attainder in the Reign of Henry VIII, 29 HIST . J. 
1-15 (1986) (referring to a case of 1531). 
39 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 37-38 
(1986).  Coke says that he had learned from Sir Thomas Gawdy, “who lived at that time,” that Henry 
VIII had commanded him to attend the chief justices for their opinions.  It has been assumed, and 
seems most likely, that the reference is to Cromwell’s case. KENNETH PICKTHORN, EARLY TUDOR 
GOVERNMENT 431-434 (1934); GOUGH , FUNDAMENTAL LAW 43; OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 68.  Gawdy was a young member of the Inner Temple in 1540, but probably not yet a 
barrister.   
40 Elton, supra note 15, at 227. 
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II.      The Body of Rights 
¶ 13 There is no universally agreed corpus of human rights.  Even if there were, it 
would have to be set down in words, and words are susceptible of a wide variety of 
interpretations.  We have had two or three major attempts at codification, notably the 
Constitution of the United States (1787) and the subsequent Bill of Rights (1791), the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which last has 
been engrafted onto United Kingdom law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.  These 
may be taken as a guide, though they are very different in content and understanding, even 
if we take the United States Constitution to mean what the Supreme Court now says it 
means rather than what it meant to the framers.  To take but one example, the U.S. 
Constitution is currently interpreted as making it unlawful to proscribe abortion, on the 
footing that it would be an invasion of privacy, and a similar conclusion could be drawn 
from the guarantee of respect for private life in the European Convention.41  However, 
another provision of the European Convention guaranteeing “human life”—which some 
construe to include potential or incipient life, or the condition of a thriving fetus—may 
come to be interpreted as having exactly the opposite effect.42  The fact is that rights are 
necessarily contingent on the state of society, and its general assumptions, either at the time 
they are cast into words or whenever they subsequently come to be reinterpreted.  In 
1787 abortion was a crime at common law43 and no one would have imagined that the 
Constitution was designed to alter that.  When Thomas Jefferson proclaimed it a self-
evident truth that all men are created equal, he did not reduce the stock of slaves in his 
basement at Montecello.  Nor did anyone at that time suppose that his “inalienable right” 
to life made capital punishment illegal.  Likewise in the sixteenth century, there would not 
have been widespread support for the abolition of capital punishment, though in fact the 
judges disliked an automatic death penalty and tolerated or encouraged many practical 
means of escape from it.44  Freedom of religion would have been a notion impossible to 
comprehend in an age which held that there was only one true catholic Church, whether 
Roman or Protestant.  Even in the religious context, however, the fluctuations of official 
religious policy in sixteenth-century England forced intelligent people to confront genuine 
differences of conscience, which for most of the time were tolerated far more in reality than 
the statute-books imply.45  For instance, two of the busiest counsel practising in the Court 
of Queen’s Bench in the last quarter of the sixteenth century (Robert Atkinson and Richard 
Godfrey) were men who as Roman Catholics had been formally disbarred—and actually 
expelled from their inns of court—for recusancy. 46  Then again, the European prohibition 
                                                 
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
42 The point was raised but avoided in Open Door Counselling v. Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88, 
14235/88, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244 (1993). 
43 The incorrect statements to the contrary in Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, were a result of failing to carry out 
historical research. 
44 Especially through the fictional extension of benefit of clergy, though this was gradually regulated 
by statute to prevent abuse in cases of serious crime. 
45 See REPORTS FROM THE LOST NOTEBOOKS OF SIR JAMES DYER lxvii-lxxv.  
46 J. H. BAKER, READERS AND READINGS IN THE INNS OF COURT AND CHANCERY 6, n.31 (2001).  
Complaint was made in Parliament in 1626 that popish lawyers living outside the inns of court were 
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on “degrading” punishment would have made no sense in an age which believed that the 
severest forms of punishment, to be an effective deterrent, ought to be as degrading as 
possible.  Even so, a convicted prisoner was entitled to the protection of the law.  Coke, 
citing Bracton, held that gaolers were forbidden “to inflict harm upon prisoners, as by 
keeping them in shackles . . . because a gaol ought to be for containment and not for 
punishment.”47  Torture, though certainly used in treason investigations under warrants 
from the secretary of state or attorney-general,48 was never acknowledged as lawful by the 
English courts.49  Indeed, there was no common-law authority approving it, and the 
balance of explicit authority was against it,50 whereas the Civil law treated it as a routine 
part of criminal procedure: judicial torture was used in Prussia until 1754, and in France 
until 1780.51  Enlightened opinion has properly changed over the centuries.  Yet it was 
recently reported in the press that, since the United States government had found terrorists 
unwilling to assist the police with their enquiries, they were thinking of introducing “harsher 
interrogation techniques” for defendants suspected of terrorism.  I do not know what this 
means in practice, and perhaps we shall not be told; but the point is that such things are still 
thinkable when people are alarmed.  The Roman Catholic terrorist Guy Fawkes was 
famously subject to “harsh interrogation” in the Tower to name his accomplices, the king 
himself instructing the examiners to begin with “gentler tortures” and then step them up by 
degrees.52  This may strike us as barbaric, and it was certainly contrary to our current 
notions of human rights.  But Fawkes would have been the al-Q’aida hero of his day if his 
plot to blow up the king in Parliament on 5 November 1605 had not been uncovered by 
intelligence in the nick of time; and even he was accorded a regular jury trial.  The day of 
deliverance, 5 November, is still celebrated in England.53 
 
¶ 14 Having made those reservations, we may turn to the other principal items in 
our modern lists of human rights—no slavery, the right to a fair trial, no punishment without 
law, and the protection of property or possessions.  Here we might fairly say that such 
principles were part and parcel of the common law, and indeed the glory of the common 
law.  Whoever actually penned the Universal Declaration of 1948 and the European 
                                                                                                                                        
continuing to practice. 3 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1626 312 (W. B. Bidwell & M. Jansson eds., 
1992).  
47 COKE, supra  note 39, at 34. 
48 Including Coke. Its use seems to have been confined to treason cases, where it was thought 
justified for reasons of state. 
49 Excepting the barbarous peine forte et dure, which was the penalty for refusing to accept jury trial, 
no one could be tried by jury without his or her consent. 
50 Coke wrote in his old age: “there is no law to warrant tortures in this land, nor can they be justified 
by any prescription being so lately brought in.” COKE, supra  note 39, at 35. For this proposition he 
vouched Fortescue, who wrote in the fifteenth century that torture was contrary to the common law.  
(Coke had nevertheless been professionally involved with several examinations on the rack.) Id.  
51 J. H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 62, 64 (1977).   
52 Id. at 85. 
53 Fawkes was put to the rack on 9 Nov., by virtue of a warrant in the king’s own hand dated 6 Nov., 
and named his fellow conspirators.  He was subsequently indicted, tried by jury, convicted, and 
executed.  Gunpowder Day is still an official day of thanksgiving in England (according to the 1662 
Book of Common Prayer), but is nowadays celebrated with bonfires and fireworks rather than sermons 
and prayers. 
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Convention of 1950,54 the definitions could well have been written by an English barrister 
in the Temple copying phrases from textbooks on the British constitution or from 
Blackstone.  And much of it would have seemed perfectly straightforward to an English 
lawyer in the Renaissance period.  By the time of Coke, and probably a century earlier,55 
lawyers regarded these broad principles as fundamental law enshrined in chapter 29 of 
Magna Carta:  
No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseised of 
his free hold, or liberties or free customs, or outlawed, 
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed 
against him, save by the lawful judgment of his peers or 
by the law of the land.  We shall not sell, deny or delay 
to any man right or justice.56    
¶ 15 In fact they were wrong historically, but that made no difference.  Magna 
Carta, though not a constitution, was morally entrenched; and chapter 29 was the chief 
legal weapon deployed against growing absolutism.  It had been repeated and enlarged in 
a series of medieval statutes culminating in that of 1354 which introduced the phrase “due 
process of law.”57  It was again repeated and enlarged in the Petition of Right 1628, to 
which King Charles I gave his full assent.  No one could be taxed without the consent of 
Parliament.  No one could be imprisoned, or deprived of his freehold property, or in any 
way “destroyed”, except by the “lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”   
 
A.    No Slavery   
¶ 16 Although the common law did recognize a form of unfree status—villeinage—
it did not acknowledge lawful slavery.  Even villeinage found little favour with early-modern 
English lawyers.  In the 1520’s, it was said at a moot in Gray’s Inn that villeinage was “an 
odious thing in law and not favoured, for it is absolutely contrary to liberty, and liberty is 
one of the things which the law most favours.”58  In practice, villeinage was becoming 
obsolete in the sixteenth century and by the seventeenth was for all practical purposes 
extinct.  This universal freedom was achieved not through legislation but by the operation 
of common-law procedures in which juries almost always pronounced (truthfully or 
                                                 
54 The complex story has now been unravelled in A. W. B. SIMPSON , HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END 
OF EMPIRE : BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2001).  A draft was 
prepared by Geoffrey Wilson of No. 1, Mitre Court, in the Temple, but it was not adopted. 
55 When the judges advised King Henry VIII that he could not imprison subjects without cause, or use 
his subjects contrary to the law, they cited Magna Carta, c. 29. Serjeant Browne’s Case, 93 SELDEN 
SOC’Y 184. 
56 Clause 39 of the original charter of 1215, but numbered c. 29 in the statutory form of 1225. 
57 28 Edward III, c. 3 (“Item qe nul homme, de quel estate ou condition qil soit, ne soit osté de terre ne 
de tenement, ne pris, nemprisoné, ne disherité, ne mis a mort, saunz estre mesné en respons par due 
proces de lei,” which may be translated thus: “No man, of whatever estate or condition, shall be put 
out from land or tenement, taken or imprisoned, disinherited, or put to death, without being brought to 
answer by due process of law.”). 
58 Harvard Law School, MS. 47, fo. 59 (translated). 
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otherwise) in favour of liberty.59  A century or so later, English legal doctrine was to prevail 
even against a growing commercial acceptance of negro slavery.  As Chief Justice Holt 
ruled in about 1702, “as soon as a negro comes to England he is free; one may be a villein 
in England, but not a slave.”60  The rest of that story is well known.  Slavery was not in 
practice ended by declarations of rights. 
 
B.    No Punishment without Law   
¶ 17 The medieval gaol delivery system ensured that, in routine cases, no one could 
be held in gaol for more than six months at the outside, that being the interval between 
assizes.  Whether or not the prosecution was fully prepared, the defendant was entitled to 
be “discharged by proclamation” at the next gaol delivery if no evidence was offered 
against him.  Bail was widely available, and guaranteed by medieval legislation, except in 
the most serious cases.  Any form of imprisonment could be challenged by habeas 
corpus, a remedy which we now know to have been developed for this purpose during 
the sixteenth century.61 
 
C.    Fair Trial62   
¶ 18 Since the fourteenth century the common law had forbidden anyone to be tried 
for a capital offence without a precise accusation, either by appeal of felony or indictment.  
Most criminal accusations in the Renaissance period were by indictment, that is, a specific 
written accusation approved by at least twelve sworn members of the public.  The trial 
itself was by a jury of twelve neighbours, who had to be unanimous; and the defendant 
could challenge up to thirty-five of them before they were sworn in, without showing 
cause.63  The rules of evidence were not yet developed, but it was the supposedly dreaded 
Star Chamber which proclaimed in 1607 that “it were better to acquit twenty that are 
guilty than condemn one innocent.”64  Witnesses were generally brought face-to-face with 
the accused, and their testimony could be challenged.   
 
¶ 19 Now, it would obviously invite an accusation of naivety to set out the positive 
case without acknowledging that the reality in Tudor and Stuart England often fell far short 
                                                 
59 For a summary of the full story, see J. H. Baker, Personal Liberty under the Common Law of 
England, 1200-1600, in THE ORIGINS OF MODERN FREEDOM IN THE WEST 178 (R.W. Davis ed., 
1995). 
60 Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. 666 (1702).  Cf. Shanley v. Harvey, 2 Eden 126, 127 (1763), per Lord 
Hardwicke, L.C. (“As soon as a man sets foot on English ground he is free.”).  For some qualifications, 
see J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY  475-477 (4th ed., 2002). 
61 See  109 SELDON SOC’Y, supra  note 26, at lxxvi-lxxxiii; OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
91-94. 
62 See generally  J. H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law, in THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW  259-301 (1986); Pleas of the Crown: Criminal Procedure, in 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 570-593 (3d ed., 1990). 
63 The number of peremptory challenges was reduced in 1530 to twenty. 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14. 
64 Literally, “it were better to aquite twenty that are guyltie than condempe one Innocente.” J. 
HAWARDE, CASES IN CAMERA STELLATA 320 (W. P. Baildon ed. 1894). 
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of the ideal.  At courtroom level, ordinary trials—even on capital charges—were 
conducted with a haste and lack of circumspection which strikes us as shocking.  (So they 
still were, let it be said, in the “age of reason”).  The worst defect was that, in capital 
cases, the defendant was not allowed counsel except to argue a point of law.65  But 
standards take centuries to evolve: as Coke himself was fond of saying, nothing is perfect 
at the same moment that it is invented.66  It would indeed be astonishing if no changes had 
occurred in the legal system in the last four centuries.  The suggestion is not that the legal 
system of Coke’s day would stand scrutiny in a court of human rights at the present day, 
but that it was moved and directed by the same basic principles as are found in the 
declarations of rights.  The government—the Crown—was subject to the law.  The 
judges, if occasionally subservient, often ruled against the Crown and set bounds on the 
prerogative.67  The Crown could not interfere with private property rights by exercising the 
prerogative in new ways; and if any minister of the Crown purported to act unlawfully, his 
act was deemed invalid, for the Crown could do no wrong to a subject.  In the criminal 
sphere, it is true that some prisoners who were considered dangerous to the very existence 
of the state—such as Guy Fawkes—were tortured before trial, to extract information, and 
were effectively beyond the reach of habeas corpus.  But prisoners in general were 
protected against imprisonment without trial, all were allowed their say in court, and none 
could be put to death without the unanimous verdict of twelve citizens.  Even those 
accused of high treason stood some chance of acquittal, or of having their prosecution 
dropped on the legal advice of the judges.   
 
III.       Fundamental Law and Judicial Review 
¶ 20 The most difficult aspect of our historical comparison is that of the hierarchy of 
rights.  Human rights in the modern sense are by definition protected against contrary 
national laws, and therefore represent a form of higher law.  Under current British doctrine, 
such a notion cannot readily be squared with the political fact that Parliament is sovereign 
and that the courts will not overturn an act of Parliament on the grounds that it contradicts 
some higher law.  There are nevertheless two considerable qualifications to the sovereignty 
of Parliament: one is the political difficulty of flying in the face of accepted principles of 
natural justice, and the other is that statutes have to be interpreted before they can be 
applied in practice.  The first qualification means that Parliament is only likely to infringe 
accepted human rights in borderline cases, where opinions differ on the point in question.  
If no one is quite sure where a right begins and ends, and that must often be the case, 
Parliament may be tempted to make its own judgment; and it is probably better placed to 
do so than the judges or the human rights lawyers.  But if and when Parliament does make 
its own judgment, the result will always be subject to the second qualification.  It did not 
require a Human Rights Act for the judges to bring into play presumptions in interpreting 
statutes, which belong to the same genre as the old maxim that the king can do no wrong.  
                                                 
65 It must be remembered that in most ordinary cases the Crown was not represented either.  The 
inequality was most glaring in state trials, where the evidence was led by a law officer and the prisoner 
had to speak for himself. 
66 “Nihil insimul inventum est et perfectum.” SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTE 
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON  230a, 377b (1812). 
67 For some Elizabethan examples, see 109 SELDON SOC’Y, supra note 26, at xii-ciii. 
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Parliament cannot be presumed to have intended something manifestly unjust unless the 
words it has used permit no other conclusion.  Ministers who insist on introducing patently 
unjust legislation in the teeth of a court ruling will have to face their electorate.  Thus, even 
if Parliament has the theoretical last word in any tussle with the courts, the presumption of 
righteous intentions may deprive the principle of most of its force. 
 
¶ 21 These qualifications may lead us to an understanding of what sometimes 
appears to have been a greater willingess on the part of English judges in the Renaissance 
period to question legislation.  There was, in theory, a further weapon in the judicial arsenal 
of that period in the form of natural law.  Following the writers on Canon law, Fortescue in 
the fifteenth century,68 St. German in the sixteenth,69 and Coke in the seventeenth,70 all held 
that a statute contrary to the law of nature would be void.  Yet the concept of natural law 
in England bore little or no fruit in practice, except as an occasional (and rather outlandish) 
source of principle in common law and equity.71  Modern English lawyers would say that 
natural law—as higher law—is incompatible with parliamentary sovereignty.  But the root 
cause of its impotence was not that anyone in the medieval or early-modern period thought 
Parliament exempt from natural law.  It was rather that no inferior court could adjudge the 
acts of the High Court of Parliament to be contrary to natural law.  In other words, it was 
simply a jurisdictional principle developed before the importance of the separation of 
powers had been perceived.72  That is the reason why there is no known instance, in any 
period, of an English statute ever being held void on the grounds that it conflicted with the 
law of nature.  The concept of fundamental law sat more easily with the rhetoric of political 
argument, or the abstractions of philosophical speculation, than with the conventions of 
judicial decision-making.73 
 
                                                 
68 See De Natura Legis Naturae , discussed in N. DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE 
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW  75-78 (1990). 
69 DOCTOR AND STUDENT 12 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974) (a statute cannot prevail 
against natural law, because if it is brought in against natural law it is no statute but void). 
70 E.g., Calvin’s Case, (1608) 7 Co. Rep. 1, at ff. 13v (“the very law of nature itself never was nor could 
be altered or changed.  And therefore it is certainly true that jura naturalia sunt immutabilia”);  “the 
statute of 25 Ed. 3. cap. 22 . . . extends only to legal protection . . . for the parliament could not take 
away that protection which the law of nature gives him.” id. at 14; “whatsoever is due by the law of 
nature cannot be altered . . .. [transl. The laws of nature are completely perfected and immutable, 
whereas the law of man has a finite quality and there is nothing in it which can stand for ever: human 
laws are born, they live, and they die].” id. at 25. 
71 For the eighteenth century see D. J. Ibbetson, Natural Law and Common Law , 5 EDINBURGH L.  
REV. 4-20 (2001).  
72 See, e.g., Chedder v. Savage, (1406) Y.B. Mich. 8 Hen. IV, fo. 12, pl. 13, at fo. 13, per Tyrwhit (“est un 
judgement doné en parliament, que ne poyt estre reversé ou revoké en court pluis base.”); Anon . 
(1443) Y.B. Trin. 21 Hen. VI, fo. 56, pl. 13, per Paston, J. (“quant un estatute est fait, tout soit ceo 
encounter ley, et mischevous, uncore serra tenus pur ley tanque que il soit repel et adnul.”); 
Pilkington’s Case, (1455) Y.B. Pas. 33 Hen. VI, fo. 17, pl. 8, at fo. 18, per Fortescue, C.J. (“cest un acte 
de parlement et nous voillomus estre bien avisé devant que nous adnullamus ascun acte fait en le 
parlement.”). 
73 For a full discussion see generally GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY . 
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¶ 22 In practice the courts seem to have relied more on the notions of absurdity, 
repugnancy, and impossibility.  Parliament cannot require two things that are mutually 
inconsistent, and so internal contradictions in legislation have to be resolved by the courts.  
Nor can it do the impossible; and our predecessors thought that impossibility could include 
legal impossibility.  Thus, a fifteenth-century reader on chapter 9 of Magna Carta held that 
the confirmation of liberties to the city of London was void on the rather pedantic ground 
that a city—as a physical entity consisting of houses and streets—was dead and without 
legal capacity to accept a grant.74  I think the technical point was that the confirmation 
should have been made to the mayor and commonalty of London; lawyers could not yet 
easily separate corporate personality from people.  On a similar principle, other readers 
held void the grant of liberties to the Church of England (“ecclesia anglicana”) in chapter 
1 of Magna Carta, since the Church was not a corporation.  Unreasonableness could be 
dealt with by the presumption that Parliament cannot have intended something 
unreasonable.  Coke wrote in the Fourth Institute:  
When a law is worded generally, it is to be restrained in 
such a way that, when the reason for it ceases, it no 
longer applies; for since reason is the soul and strength 
of the law, the legislator is not deemed to have intended 
something which wants reason, even if the generality of 
the words at first glance suggests otherwise.75   
The furthest reach of this principle is widely supposed to have been Dr. Bonham’s Case 
(1610), where Coke as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas stated that “in many cases the 
common law will control acts of Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void; for when an act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge such act to be 
void.”76  Although we now know that Coke was the only member of the court who 
decided the case on this ground,77 he himself set great store by it and copied out this 
passage twice in his own hand.78  It was a controversial position at the time, and drew a 
condemnation from Lord Chancellor Ellesmere.79  Yet it was not wholly new.80  In a 
                                                 
74 JOHN SPELLMAN’S READING ON QUO W ARRANTO, 113 SELDEN SOC’Y 4-5 (J.H. Baker ed. 1997).  
What he meant was that the confirmation should more correctly have been expressed as made to the 
mayor and commonalty of the city, since they were a corporation. 
75 COKE, supra  note 39, at 330-331. 
76 Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114 (1610).  There is a convenient summary of the various 
interpretations of this case in JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY , THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT : 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 111-12 (1999).  
77 C. M. Gray, Bonham’s Case Revisited, 116 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 35-58 (1972). 
78 Once in his autograph report of the case (Cambridge Univ. Lib. MS. Ii.5.21(2), fo. 93v); and again in a 
manuscript note now at Yale University (Beinecke Library, Law School MS. G. R24.1, fo. 157v). 
79 BAKER, supra note 59, at 210-211. 
80 See  SIR CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES or ACTS OF PARLIAMENT : 
AND THE EXPOSITION THEREOF 19, fn.9 (1677) (“I should never think, that any Law positive, or 
constitution, should bind, but that which is rightly ordained.”).  This treatise is attributed on the title -
page to Sir Christopher Hatton (d. 1591), though the attribution has been questioned.  There is an 
oblique reference on page ninteen to the earl of Leicester (d. 1588) as “lately deceased”, which 
suggests a date of composition around 1589-1590. 
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previously unnoticed moot in Gray’s Inn, from the later 1520’s, where the question arose 
whether Parliament could sanction the grant of land on condition that it could not escheat, 
several opinions were expressed that, although Parliament could make new law, it could 
not enact something repugnant, absurd, or contrary to law and reason.81  This included, for 
at least some of the participants, a statute removing a piece of land from all human 
ownership (absurd), a statutory feoffment of land without the right to take the income 
(repugnant), or a statutory grant of land in fee on terms that it should not descend to heirs 
(against law and reason).  In a real case of the same period, it was argued that Parliament 
could not alter immemorial local customs such as gavelkind.82  But that was probably also 
a point of interpretation: a general statute would not be taken to derogate from a particular 
local custom without expressly mentioning it.83  These are not human rights, nor even 
principles of natural law, though it is easy to see how the same principle of interpretation 
could be extended in the hands of a Coke—or a Holt84—to include provisions which 
conflicted with natural justice. 
 
¶ 23 It is not my contention that the rule of law always prevailed in Renaissance 
England, or that human rights as now understood were always protected—any more than 
they are at the present day.  But it is not so absurd to propose that the rule of law was an 
accepted constitutional principle in the Tudor and Stuart periods, and that many—though 
certainly not quite all—of the rights now classified as “human rights” would have been 
recognized without difficulty by English lawyers of that period.  The principal difference, 
perhaps, is that in earlier periods the ideals were embodied within the common law itself 
and subject to development through precedent.  Even in 1950, when the European 
Convention was settled with the active participation of the United Kingdom government, it 
was believed in Whitehall that the convention merely codified well-known common-law 
ideals and was not likely to challenge the operation of English law itself, except perhaps in 
                                                 
81 BL MS. Add. 35939, fo. 269.  The date is fixed between 1526 and 1529 by the description of Richard 
Broke as chief baron of the Exchequer and Christopher Hales as solicitor-general.  A translation from 
the law French text is appended to this paper. 
82 Marmyon v. Baldwyn, (1527) BL MS. Hargrave 388, fo. 236v, per More, J. (“This is a local custom . . . 
like various other customs within the realm which cannot now be changed and altered from their 
nature by the king or by Parliament: for instance, the custom of gavelkind.” (translated)).   
83 In the case in question, the city of London had claimed, through its recorder, that “they [the mayor 
and citizens] ought not by reason of any statute made contrary to the liberties and customs of the 
aforesaid city alter or infringe its liberties or free customs used from ancient time unless express 
mention is made thereof in the aforesaid statute.” King’s Bench plea roll, KB 27/1062, m. 64 
(translated).  The city also relied on Magna Carta, c. 9, which confirmed to London its liberties and 
free customs; but they did not e xplicitly suggest that this operated as a kind of fundamental law. 
84 See  City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687-688 (1702), in THOMAS LEACH, MODERN REPORTS: 
OR, SELECT CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH, CHANCERY, COMMON PLEAS, AND 
EXCHEQUER 669, 687-688 (1796) (Holt, C.J. said that “if an Act of Parliament  should ordain that the 
same person should be party and judge . . . it would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible 
that one should be judge and party, for the judge is to determine between party and party, or between 
the government and the party; and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several 
things that look pretty odd . . ..”).  Holt, C.J. here approved of Coke, C.J.’s dictum in Dr. Bonham’s 
Case, and said it was “far from any extravagancy.”  But he was probably the last judge to treat it as 
representing English law. 
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the colonies.  Indeed, the affair was entrusted to the Foreign Office as a matter of 
international relations rather than of domestic jurisprudence.  Fifty years later, as a result of 
activities in Strasbourg, the conception of human rights in the United Kingdom has 
undergone a transformation.  They are no longer seen as a set of essentially British ideas, 
rooted in history, shared by other civilized nations, and framed into a code chiefly for the 
purpose of export to less favoured parts of the globe.  They have become instead a source 
of ammunition for overturning domestic judicial precedent and legislation by recourse to 
vaguely defined concepts, sometimes interpreted in a mechanical way without reference to 
history, and an unlimited selection of loosely related ideas from around the world.  The 
obvious danger of this newer movement is not merely uncertainty—which, paradoxically, is 
itself inconsistent with the rule of law—but the increasing politicisation of an unelected 
judiciary.  Whether that is a fair price to pay for a formal check on Parliament will be one 
of the great issues for the United Kingdom in the present century. 
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APPENDIX I: 
A MOOT IN GRAY’S INN, c. 1526/29 
BL MS. Add. 35939, fo. 269 (translated from law French). 
Lands are given by Parliament upon condition that they should not escheat to the lord from 
whom they are held.  Is the condition good, or not? 
 
Walsingham.  It is all good, for everyone is privy to the Parliament and the Parliament 
may enact a thing which is contrary to the common law.  Thus if a feoffment is made to an 
abbot, by Parliament, on condition that the lord shall not enter for mortmain, this is good; 
and yet a party may not make such a condition by his deed.  Likewise if lands are given by 
Parliament to a man upon condition that, if he dies, his heir (under age) shall not be in 
ward, this is good; for the Parliament may do what a party may not.  But if lands are given 
by Parliament upon condition that he cannot take the profits, this is void; for it is repugnant. 
 
Wroth to the contrary.  Parliament may not do something which is against law and reason, 
any more than a party may.  Therefore if lands are given upon condition that they shall not 
descend, this is void; likewise by the party’s deed.  Here, then, is a similar situation (tiel 
operation), because the land is revertible to the lord paramount when the tenant dies 
without heir, in the same way as the land descends to the son when the father dies.  
Therefore etc. 
 
The reader agreed with this opinion.  But they said that the grant is good.85 
 
Hales, Sol.-Gen.  An [act of] Parliament shall be construed by common law and reason, 
and if the [act of] Parliament is so obscure that the intention thereof cannot be understood 
by law or reason it is void.  But it seems to me that this is not a condition, for then it ought 
to abridge the estate or else augment the estate.  For instance, if lands are given for life 
upon condition that if he does not pay so much money on such a day etc. the feoffor shall 
re-enter.  Conversely, if lands are given upon condition that if the donee dies without heir 
of his body the land shall remain to a stranger in fee: this is not a condition but only a 
limitation of the remainder after the tail determines.  Likewise here, the estate has its full 
perfection before the condition ought to take effect, and therefore it is no condition.  As to 
the matter, it seems that it is good by [act of] Parliament, for the Parliament may make a 
law, so long as it stands with reason and is not absurd (inconvenient).  However, if it is 
absurd, the [act of] Parliament is void: for instance, if it is enacted by Parliament that an 
acre of land called etc. shall be in no man, and shall not be held of any man.  But here it is 
                                                 
85 Perhaps meaning that it was free of the condition. 
 
a prejudice only to the lord paramount.  Therefore etc. 
 
Petyt agreed that the act was good in all respects, and said that it was a good condition—
for here are words of condition, namely sub conditione, which make a condition—and 
that he who gave [the land] through the act of Parliament may re-enter.  For, even if it is 
not expressly stated that he may re-enter, it is nevertheless implied.  So it is where lands 
are given upon condition that the donee shall pay me £10 of money, without saying any 
more, this is good and it is implied as much as if he had said that if does not pay the feoffor 
shall re-enter.  So it is if the condition is that he shall enfeoff John Style, without saying 
more. 
 
BROKE, Chief Baron—as I heard, though I was not there—argued that he who gave [the 
land] through Parliament shall not have it, for he has barred himself from all his interest by 
the [act of] Parliament.  But he said that the king shall have it; and the king was bound by 
the said [act of] Parliament. 
